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Abstract
The investment and excitement surrounding self-driving vehicles are huge. We know from earlier transport innovations that technological tran-
sitions can reshape lives, livelihoods, and places in profound ways. There is therefore a case for wide democratic debate, but how should this
take place? In this paper, we explore the tensions between democratic experiments and technological ones with a focus on policy for nascent
self-driving/automated vehicles. We describe a dominant model of public engagement that imagines increased public awareness leading to
acceptance and then adoption of the technology. We explore the flaws in this model, particularly in how it treats members of the public as users
rather than citizens and the presumption that the technology is well-defined. Analysing two large public dialogue exercises in which we were
involved, our conclusion is that public dialogue can contribute to shifting established ideas about both technologies and the public, but that this
reframing demands openness on the part of policymakers and other stakeholders. Rather than seeing public dialogues as individual exercises,
it would be better to evaluate the governance of emerging technologies in terms of whether it takes place ‘in dialogue’.
Key words: emerging technologies; self-driving cars; automated vehicles; public dialogue; governance; public engagement with science and technology.
1. Introduction: frame-breaking
Developments in artificial intelligence and robotics have led
some innovators to conclude that driving, a task previously
considered impossible to automate, is now solvable (Stilgoe
2018). The momentum and the scale of investment mean
we can anticipate with some confidence profound changes
to people’s mobility, the structure of industries and, even-
tually, the design of public space, even if we cannot predict
the distribution, shape, or direction of such changes. Much
of the mainstream debate on the possibilities and pitfalls of
the technology has taken place in terms of safety, focussing
either on the lives that could be saved by the technology or
the potential risks and ethical dilemmas posed by automated
decision-making (Cohen et al. 2020).
Once the opportunities and uncertainties are opened up
to scrutiny by stakeholders, the range of possible issues that
might affect or be affected by the technology looks much
broader (Cohen et al. 2018). The trajectories of technolo-
gies and associated policies are not yet set. The case for
broad democratic debate about the technology is therefore
strong. However, the structure of this debate, its appropri-
ate participants, and the content of the conversation remain
contested.
In this paper, we analyse how innovators’ and policymak-
ers’ views of the public are tied to their views of automated
vehicle (AV) technology. A technologically determinist pre-
sumption of the inevitability of self-driving is coupled to a
diagnosis of public acceptance as a major problem. We review
the literature on public engagement in innovation and trans-
port in order to understand the construction of this frame.
We then consider the potential of deliberative public dialogue
exercises as experiments in frame-breaking.1
Our findings come from stakeholder workshops, more than
50 interviews with stakeholders and technology developers
as part of the Driverless Futures project, and our experience
helping to design and run public dialogue activities. We have
two major case studies of public dialogue, both of which we
helped design, facilitate, and analyse. The first was run under
the aegis of Sciencewise, on behalf of the UK Department
for Transport (DfT). In partnership with Traverse, a special-
ist public dialogue organisation, we won the contract for this
project and worked with policymakers and other stakehold-
ers to design the process, help facilitate the sessions, and
report on the findings. The second exercise—the Citizens’ Dia-
logue on Driverless Mobility—was part of an international
dialogue programme initiated by Missions Publiques and the
Consortium for Science Policy and Outcomes at Arizona State
University. We worked with Involve, a participation think
tank, to bring Transport for Greater Manchester (TfGM) into
the process. We then helped run the day of public dialogue.
We both have long histories doing, analysing, and advocating
for public dialogue in policymaking. We might therefore be
characterised as action-researchers.
These early experiments in organised public dialogue
offer a sense of the possibilities and constraints for public
engagement. Such exercises are typically pulled in oppos-
ing directions: towards relevance and towards an authentic
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representation of public values and priorities. Managing the
tensions demands careful negotiation. Our conclusion is an
optimistic one, that public dialogue can contribute to con-
structive movement of debates about the means and ends of
technology, as part of a process of social learning. But it
is important to first recognise the institutionally-embedded
assumptions that might make such movement hard. In doing
public dialogue, we wanted to learn, first, how citizens imag-
ined futures involving AVs and, second, howmore democratic
approaches to governance might enable greater alignment
between technological visions and public values.
1.1 The public as a problem in innovation and
transport
The relationship between new technologies and the public is
a prominent concern for both innovation policy and trans-
port policy. Widely-invoked models of innovation diffusion
start from the assumption that the success of new technologies
depends upon their uptake by users. Everett Rogers (1983)
sees innovation moving through phases of knowledge, per-
suasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation (See also
Davis (1989) and Sovacool and Hess (2017)).
The recognition that new technologies do not sell them-
selves has led to innovators to problematise the public, but
this attention has tended to frame the public as passive con-
sumers of innovation. Prospective users, from this view, may
be demarcated into ‘early adopters’ or ‘laggards’, but the pre-
sumption is that the laggards are only delaying the inevitable
and the task is therefore to accelerate their acceptance. The
problem of acceptance has its roots in studies of change
management with new technologies in business. Venkatesh
(2003)’s ‘unified theory of acceptance and use of technology’
focuses on employees’ use of workplace information technol-
ogy (IT). Another influential analysis considers acceptance
as a triangle, with socio-political, community, and market
aspects (Wüstenhagen et al. 2007). The notion of ‘accep-
tance’ has been adopted, turned into a target, and spread far
beyond its original analytical location with little critical anal-
ysis (Batel et al. 2013). Shove (1998) considers, in the case of
energy-saving technologies, how the identification of ‘gaps’
between actual and potential technology use contributes to
a separation between the technical and the social aspects of
innovation. A techno-centric view sees the potential of tech-
nologies like insulation, smart meters, and wind turbines as
unarguable, so the problem becomes one of public uptake.
The behaviour of the public is seen as the limiting factor: an
uncertainty to be resolved as part of the managed transition
to more sustainable systems. This leads to the prioritising of
social research aiming to understand the public as a ‘barrier’
to widespread adoption (Shove 1998).
‘Acceptance’ implies a problem, locates it outside technol-
ogy, and suggests that the role of the public is reactive and
necessarily fatalistic. The language has echoes of psychother-
apy, in which patients are asked to understand and surrender
to their circumstances, with acceptance being the final stage
of dealing with grief. In the context of emerging technologies,
this therapeutic fallacy contributes to a sense of fatalism that
impedes good governance. With new technologies, ‘accep-
tance’ is a function of technological determinism, which limits
‘the scope of enquiry to monitoring the social adjustments…
required by technological progress’ (Williams and Edge 1996:
866). Where members of the public express doubts, this is
often labelled ‘resistance’ (e.g. Juma 2016), which, from the
technocratic standpoint, looks ‘irrational, morally bad or at
best understandable but futile’ (Bauer 1997: 2). This prob-
lematisation of the public overlooks the potential of mem-
bers of the public to constructively challenge, co-create, or
innovate.
This construction of a public for innovation reflects the
‘imagined lay person’ (Maranta et al. 2003) that acts as
a working model for scientists and their institutions when
they enter the public domain. A ‘deficit model’ of the pub-
lic (Sturgis and Allum 2004) that prescribes programmes of
scientific literacy with the hope of increasing public trust still
dominates (Rayner 2004; Wynne 2006). Scientism—the def-
inition of public issues in terms of science and the lack of
consideration of values within science (Welsh and Wynne
2013; Rommetveit and Wynne 2017)—is rife.
A growing concern with understanding the nature of pub-
lic resistance to science and innovation has meant that earlier
attempts at one-way science communication have been dis-
placed by new forms of two-way deliberation in Northern
Europe, the USA, and elsewhere. In the UK, public partic-
ipation has been a part of many areas of public policy for
decades, particularly at a local level. The use of mini-publics
(Goodin and Dryzek 2006)—small groups of citizens whose
discussions are assumed to reflect those of the wider public—
is more recent but has become common, particularly in policy
areas involving science and technology. In 2002–3, a large
British public dialogue exercise—GM Nation—attempted to
understand public views on the highly contested technology of
genetically modified crops but, according to Jasanoff (2005),
it revealed:
a dilemma confronting state efforts to democratise the pol-
itics of new and emerging technologies: on the one hand,
interacting only with identifiable stakeholders may simply
strengthen the traditionally cozy relations between busi-
ness and government; on the other hand, the public that
needs to be engaged in broader debates about the pros and
cons of technology is elusive and, in the absence of reli-
able precedents, hard to engage in deliberations whose very
authenticity and purpose are widely questioned.
As public dialogue has begun to be institutionalised in
the UK and elsewhere (Wilsdon and Willis 2004), concerns
have been raised about how dialogue exercises are framed.
Attempts at public dialogue have been tightly constrained
and occasionally asphyxiated by the people who commission,
design, and conduct them (Irwin 2006). Given the uncer-
tainties of new technologies and the political commitments
held by some groups, including businesses, policymakers, and
non-governmental organisations, who may invest in public
dialogue, there is a risk that dialogue exercises constrain cit-
izens’ participation by imposing particular framings of tech-
nology, of democracy, and of the public themselves (Chilvers
and Kearnes 2015). Public dialogue can, as well as cementing
rather than challenging existing power relations (Bickerstaff
and Walker 2005), contribute to reifying technologies that do
not yet exist.
Processes for public participation often work with idealised
conceptions of ‘ordinary’ citizens, when the reality is far more
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of the public may have contrasting ideas of the public-in-
general and publics-in-particular (Michael 2009). The theory
behind democratic deliberation presumes that citizens are able
to change their opinions in the face of evidence and contact
with others and able to reach cogent, balanced conclusions
(Chambers 2003). The reality often falls short of the neat
ideal. Even establishedmodels such as Consensus Conferences
may still produce ambiguous or conflicting outcomes. This is
not to say that such processes are not valuable—as we dis-
cuss below, we think that they can contribute vital insights
if their findings and framings are interpreted reflexively—
but we should recognise that different actors’ motivations for
deliberation may be unresolved and conflicted.
One–off public dialogue exercises have been criticised on
the grounds that they have made little actual difference to
decision-making (Smallman 2018). Such exercises have his-
torically been constrained by policymakers’ desire to control
the scope of discussion, avoid controversy, reach closure, and
generate insights that they feel would be most helpful (which
often means least disruptive) to them and their stakeholders.
Deliberative processes can be used by policymakers to delimit
or control debates by, for example, circumventing entrenched
stakeholder views (Lezaun and Soneryd 2007). Having been
involved with many such exercises as facilitators, external
experts, evaluators, and members of oversight groups, we
have often seen public participants attempt to understand and
Sustainable Urban Mobility Plans then resist the roles that
have been imagined for them.
A meta-analysis of 17 earlier Sciencewise dialogues found
that, while each brings particular issues to the fore, public
concerns about science and innovation can be derived that
are common to all, relating to the purposes of science; trust;
inclusion; speed and direction of innovation; and equity (Mac-
naghten and Chilvers 2014). These general messages have led
some to conclude that such exercises should not be seen in
isolation, but rather as part of an ongoing experiment in gov-
ernance, with the apparatus expanded to include institutions
of science and policymaking (Braun and Könninger 2018;
Chilvers and Kearnes 2015; Chilvers et al. 2018). Smallman
(2019) has shown that, even if systematic public dialogue has
had minimal impact, it has revealed a gulf between public and
elite visions of what science can and should do for society. The
context of a particular public dialogue is therefore as impor-
tant as its process, otherwise it risks being, as Thorpe (2020)
argues, just a new way to legitimise new science and technol-
ogy. Public dialogue can be seen in the context of a ‘higher
order game’ (Irwin et al. 2013: 131) or a democratic exper-
iment (Laurent 2011). When it comes to transport, debates
about innovation must contend with some well-established
political interests and models of public participation.
1.2 Engaging with transport
New transport schemes or modes are unavoidably public.
Their success rests in many cases on willing users or citizens
who are supportive of infrastructural upheaval. Transport
modelling has been criticised for encoding a view of the
public that is methodologically individualistic (Timms 2008;
Lovelace et al. 2020), with transport outcomes seen as an
aggregate of the choices of individual users operating on homo
economicus principles of rational self-interest. Within such
models, social science is imagined to play a walk-on part in
explaining what Shove (2010) calls the ‘ABC’: attitudes are
assumed to lead to behaviours and then to choices. This cre-
ates a contrasting picture of the transport user as only partially
rational and prone to habitual and emotional choice-making
(Michie et al. 2011). Meanwhile, the extrapolation of user
choices in a mode that has been called ‘predict and provide’
remains the dominant approach to transport policy (Owens
1995; Goulden et al. 2014). People, in this view, are charac-
terised as users of transport rather than citizens with multiple,
layered interests and concerns. In some places we can see
a more nuanced approach to policymaking, involving co-
design, and a growing emphasis on citizen participation (e.g.
the Sustainable Urban Mobility Plans (SUMP) development
process in European Union states (Rupprecht Consult 2019)
is gradually moving practice towards more inclusive meth-
ods). But, as Bergman et al. (2017) describe, when debates
about transport meet those about new technologies, a para-
dox is created. ‘Disruptive’ technologies such as electric or
self-driving vehicles are assumed to radically refashion trans-
port choices and yet the public are assumed to be consistent in
their behaviours. This creates incentives for the development
of new technologies to straightforwardly substitute for exist-
ing technologies rather than genuinely transform systems in
sustainable ways.
For technological transitions in transport, the public are
seen as a necessary component in the transition to improved
(safer, greener, more efficient, and fairer) transport systems.
Policymakers may desire behaviour change while also need-
ing behaviour to be predictable. The imagined public (Walker
et al. 2010; Maranta et al. 2003) hold substantial sway over
transport and infrastructure decisions, but they are seen as
resistant, conservative, emotional, NIMBYish, selfish, scien-
tifically ignorant, and unaware of the greater good (Bergman
et al. 2017; Ryghaug and Toftaker 2016; Walker et al. 2010).
In the case of electric vehicles, policymakers tend to regard the
public as ignorant of ‘whole life costs’, emotionally attached
to conventional cars (Bergman et al. 2017), or suffering from
‘range anxiety’ (Ryghaug and Toftaker 2016). The tendency
to problematise or even pathologise the public rather than
hold a mirror up to technology is an endemic feature of a
lack of institutional reflexivity (Wynne 1993). All too often,
innovators’ genuine interest in understanding what the public
might accept slips into a normative project of seeking to build
acceptance.
1.3 Awareness, acceptance, and adoption
In 2019, a new public relations initiative for the nascent self-
driving industry was announced at a giant technology confer-
ence in Las Vegas. According to their web site, the Partnership
for Automated Vehicle Education (PAVE) is a coalition with
‘one goal: to inform the public about automated vehicles and
their potential so everyone can fully participate in shaping
the future of transportation.’2 For PAVE, the technology is
inevitable if not yet complete, and it is held back by a lack
of public acceptance. According to Kelly Nantel, the co-chair
of PAVE, the moment that focussed PAVEminds on ‘the public
acceptance challenge’ was a survey from the American Auto-
mobile Association finding that almost three-quarters of the
US public were afraid to get into a self-driving vehicle. She
told in a large AV conference, ‘That’s the problem that PAVE
is designed to solve.’3
In the UK, a policy body tasked by the Government
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‘Roadmap’ in 2020 that identified the need to ‘inform the pub-
lic so that ultimately there is understanding, acceptance and
adoption’ of AVs. The document provides targets ‘Widespread
awareness of CAM [connected and automated mobility] by
2028… Public acceptance at 85 per cent by 2029… Solid
uptake of CAM-enabled services by 2030’4 without further
explanation of what is being measured or why. This fram-
ing, in which the challenge is seen as first public awareness,
then public acceptance, and finally public adoption of new
technology, has quickly become the dominant way in which
technology developers and policymakers think about the role
of the public in the development of self-driving vehicles.
An analysis of 22 German policy and stakeholder docu-
ments related to autonomous driving (Graf and Sonnberger
2019) found a similar pattern. One of the reports from BMVI
(the German ministry of transport) mentions the need for an
‘active societal dialogue’, but only in the service of ‘creating
acceptance’ (ibid.). KPMG, a consultancy firm, has produced
an Autonomous Vehicles Readiness Index that suggests ‘con-
sumer acceptance’ as an ingredient for national economic
success. Their assessment is that ‘Indians, closely followed
by Mexicans, are the most accepting of AVs… Britons then
Americans are the least accepting.’ One of their key metrics is
the proportion of the population living in areas where AVs are
being tested, the assumption being that familiarity will breed
acceptance (KPMG 2019).
Framing the public in terms of ‘acceptance’ prompts us to
ask ‘acceptance of what?’ Some proponents would argue, as
the CEO of Waymo, an AV developer, has done, that ‘Fully
self-driving cars are here,’5 but there are no viable business
models or off-the-shelf technologies for consumers or trans-
port planners to accept, let alone adopt. Prototype self-driving
vehicles currently on the streets are highly constrained in
where and how they can safely operate. In most cases, ‘safety
drivers’, remote operators, or dedicated infrastructures sup-
port systems that are far from ‘autonomous’ (Tennant and
Stilgoe, forthcoming). When neither the means nor ends of
a set of technological visions are settled, a project of building
‘acceptance’ is hard to understand.
One of our interviewees, from a company that is testing AV
technology in the UK, claimed, ‘society is the biggest barrier
to widescale adoption and acceptance’. The inconsistency is
clear, given that ‘society’ is vital for the technology’s uptake,
but the comment reflects an established view of the public as
a problem. AV proponents typically imagine the technology
as a solution to a problem of human error: humans are unre-
liable drivers and they are unaware of their own limitations.
One paper (Sparrow and Howard 2017) calls this the ‘drunk
robots’ view of humans. A commonly-invoked statistic is that
more than 90 per cent of road deaths are caused by human
error.6 There is a longer history of carmakers lobbying for
a focus on a diagnosis of human error and a prescription of
driver training as a way to push back against proposed reg-
ulations aimed at technological safety improvements (Irwin
1985; Albert 2019). In the context of self-driving vehicles, the
public are also often discussed as though they are unaware of
what is good for them, too attached to the idea of driving,
unable to understand the hazards of roads, and irrationally
afraid of automated systems.7
1.4 Assembling a public
The problematisation of the public has meant that social
science, particularly psychology, is often involved or invoked
in the prototyping of AVs. AV developers see public displays
of the technology as opportunities to impress and dispel the
fears of the public. ‘Trust’ is seen by the developers of the tech-
nology in narrow terms (Stilgoe 2021), or in abstract ways,
and there is little research on people’s actual experience with
the new technologies (Raats et al. 2020), in part because pub-
lic displays of AVs are tightly stage-managed (Marres 2020;
Haugland and Skjølsvold 2020).
Declan McDowell-Naylor (2018) conducted an ethno-
graphic study of GATEway, one of the first UK government-
funded AV projects, which involved a public ‘trial’ of
low-speed driverless pods. He asked ‘what GATEway’s trial
was in fact a test of’ and concluded that, rather than being
a test of a technology, it was the public who were on trial.
The potential for technological surprise was restricted to
give public participants the impression that the pods were
up to the job. Meanwhile, GATEway collaborators work-
ing at the Royal College of Art were asking ‘how design
can support or influence people’s attitudes towards adoption
and acceptance’ (Interview in McDowell-Naylor (2019)). The
assumed deficit here is a psychological inability to engage
with something distant, in this case a future technology. Pub-
lic engagement is not just as an attempt to understand the
public, but to assemble a public (Felt and Fochler 2010).
In the GATEway case, the public was made to suit a pre-
existing strategy, which limited the scope of what the research
project could hope to learn. Even if the aim is to understand
rather than change public views, the weight of such theoretical
baggage can prevent reflexivity. McColm’s (2017) survey of
attempts to understand public views of AVs reveals how nar-
rowly social research has been framed, largely because such
efforts have been led by people with economic interests in the
technology.
Some social scientists have been willing to play a role that
Wynne (2007: 493) characterises as delivering ‘the Holy Grail
of public acceptance for whatever technoscience might throw
up’. Research based on Venkatesh’s (2003) ‘unified theory of
acceptance and use of technology’ has started to explore the
conditions for people’s acceptance of early automated vehi-
cles (Nordhoff et al. 2016; Nordhoff et al. 2018). Some of
this work sees the public as citizens (e.g. Milakis (2019)), but
in most cases social research has followed the dominant pat-
tern of seeing public attitudes as user or consumer attitudes
(Tennant et al. 2019).
Shariff et al. (2017) see public trust in the technology as
hindered by ‘psychological roadblocks’. Their view of the
public depends on a view of the technology as inevitable if
not complete:
Manufacturers are speeding past the remaining technical
challenges to the cars’ readiness. But the biggest roadblocks
standing in the path of mass adoption may be psycho-
logical, not technological… Achieving the bright future
promised by autonomous vehicles will require overcom-
ing the psychological barriers to trust. (Shariff et al. 2017:
694).
These authors’ concern is that public reactions could ‘derail
the adoption of autonomous vehicles’ (Shariff et al. 2017:
695). Another paper from the same group rejects the possible
contribution of members of the public, arguing that ‘regu-
lations of ethical trade-offs should be left to policy experts,
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The language of acceptance suggests a category mistake.
AVs are nowhere near as mature as Shove’s (Shove 1998)
sustainability technologies or Venkatesh and Bala (2008) IT
systems, nor are the ends to which the technology suggests
a means clear. With such poorly-defined technologies, the
language of ‘acceptance’ demands additional explanation. In
conversations with AV proponents it becomes clear that the
public are being asked to do more than just welcome the tech-
nology; they are being asked to help demand it into existence,
bringing stability to the many uncertainties faced by the tech-
nology’s developers. These uncertainties relate not just to the
technology, but also to models of profitability. As with other
technologies, the success of AVs will depend on much that is
beyond the control of the developers, many of whom have
a narrow focus on software (Tennant and Stilgoe, forthcom-
ing). An insistence on public ‘acceptance’ reveals a neurosis
on the part of technology developers, that the technology will
not work as they wish, so it must be made to work by others.
‘Acceptance’ talk suggests a naïve approach to ‘heterogenous
engineering’ (Law 1987), in partial recognition of the social
changes that will be required to adapt to AV technologies that
will be inevitably limited in their scope and function.
The focus on public acceptance reflects a failure on the part
of technology developers and some policymakers to accept
the immaturity or limitations of the technology. This is not
a straightforward deficit model, or even a ‘deficit model of
innovation’ (Pfotenhauer et al. 2019), because the relevant
information or action is not specified. It seems that the pub-
lic are being asked to accept not a particular technology but
a particular model of innovation, involving a set of actors,
power structures, and governance arrangements. The public
are conjured in order to fit an assumed model of a techno-
logical transition to a self-driving future that will happen,
following Rogers, first through enthusiastic early adopters
and then through what Bickerstaff et al. (2008) call ‘reluc-
tant acceptance’ among the rest. Developers imagine external
‘roadblocks’ or ‘barriers’ to disguise their technology’s limits.
The prevailing views of both technology and the public
that we have described are the backdrop against which our
attempts at public dialogue took place. Part of our interest in
dialogue was to see if such things could be destabilised and
opened up to scrutiny. In the following section, we analyse
two public dialogue exercises in which we were involved.
1.5 The CAV public acceptability dialogue
In the UK, public dialogue on policy issues that involve science
and technology has been institutionalised through Science-
wise. Since 2004, this government programme has supported
more than 50 dialogue projects, each involving between 30
and 200 members of the public.8 The Sciencewise ‘CAV Public
Acceptability Dialogue’ was commissioned by the UKDepart-
ment for Transport in mid-2018 and took place between
October and December that year. The idea of the dialogue
began as a recommendation in a report (Cavoli et al. 2017) (of
which one of us an author) on ‘social and behavioural ques-
tions relating to autonomous vehicles’ for the Department for
Transport (DfT).9 Officials at the DfT agreed that Sciencewise
would be an appropriate model and began commissioning a
dialogue process.
The framing of the dialogue involved multiple parties and a
mix of purposes, some opaque and some crossed. The DfT’s
interest was in future transport systems. For the DfT, AVs
represented both opportunities and concerns. The Centre for
Connected and Autonomous Vehicles,10 a newly-created body
that crossed between DfT and the Department for Business,
Energy and Industrial Strategy, had a mission ‘to help ensure
that the UK remains a world leader in developing and testing
connected and autonomous vehicles’.11
The Centre for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles
(CCAV), as a servant of two masters, found itself navigating
some tensions and paradoxes, which meant its policy com-
mitments could not be total. CCAV leaders began with an
open-minded approach to public dialogue. One senior civil
servant told us,
quite a lot of public engagement work, particularly polling,
was bunk, basically, and very clearly designed with a prior
message in mind, and it felt to me that it was too important
an area of exploration to leave to people who were not
necessarily motivated by a genuine desire to explore… the
full range of questions.12
The invitation to tender for the dialogue project said ‘most
of the public are unlikely to have any experience of CAV
technology, therefore DfT considers public dialogue as the
most useful way for exploring the public acceptability of
CAVs.’ Although the shift from acceptance to ‘acceptabil-
ity’ may seem merely semantic, it at least problematises
the technology rather than the public. At early meetings,
CCAV staff expressed an interest in the substantive benefits
of deep engagement with public views. However, the project
brief included more instrumental aims, including, ‘helping to
realise any perceived benefits of CAVs (such as improved road
safety) as well as mitigate against any potential disbenefits
(such as cybersecurity fears)’. And there remained in the brief
a presumption that acceptability was a function of awareness:
‘This dialogue will explore how, why and in what circum-
stances acceptability increases or decreases, particularly in
relation to information and greater exposure to the issues.’
Starting in mid-2018, we worked with Traverse, a social
research and public deliberation organisation, to design and
conduct the dialogue exercise. As the dialogue process was
being planned in detail and the policy team consulted stake-
holders with AV interests, the language of ‘acceptance’ and the
casting of citizens as users began to creep back in. Civil ser-
vants demanded the inclusion of a session designed to assess
how willing people were to share vehicles with one another,
because this was seen as a potential barrier to people’s accep-
tance of AVs.
The dialogue exercise consisted of five groups in locations
across the UK, each with 30 participants, who were recruited
to reflect the diversity of their local populations. It took place
over three days spread over a few weeks, starting with a set of
evening focus group discussions and continuing on two Satur-
days, during which participants spoke with expert visitors and
took part in a mix of structured and unstructured small group
exercises. In three of these locations, participants were asked
to try out AV technology, variously in a driverless shuttle, a
prototype automated car, and a simulator.
By the time the dialogue sessions began, the topic guide
represented a compromise between the facilitators’ desire for
openness, policymakers’ desire for relevance and control, AV
developers’ desire to measure public acceptance, and other
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and disability rights. The tensions were also apparent in some
of the groups’ interactions with experts. At one point during
a small group discussion facilitated by one of us, a university
scientist told the participants they should use the word ‘trial’
only to describe public demonstrations of the technology, as
opposed to actual tests. Later, a policymaker who was there to
observe the sessions interrupted a group to introduce the ‘trol-
ley problem’, an applied ethics thought experiment. We had
intentionally steered clear of this, knowing that it would con-
strain participants’ discussion of other possible issues. At an
earlier group discussion, the same policymaker had suggested
that the move to a self-driving future could happen in a mat-
ter of years, like the move from horse-based to car-based cities
(The actual history, as Peter Norton et al. (2011) explains, is
far more complicated and owed as much to government pol-
icy as to technology). At another session, an expert ‘corrected’
the group discussion with reference to the Society of Auto-
motive Engineers levels, which are a problematic prescription
for technological progress (Stayton and Stilgoe 2020). These
well-meaning attempts to inform the discussion in fact closed
it down, dampening the agency of the participants, which we
and the other facilitators had made great efforts to encourage.
As facilitators, our fear was that others’ insistence on par-
ticipants experiencing the technology would also act to close
down the discussion by making the technology seem fixed
and ready to deploy. Some of the participants who rode in
the prototype AV were impressed with what it could do, but
others wondered about its limits. One talked about how a
bird had walked across the test track in front of the vehicle
she was in. The safety driver had taken control of the car in
order to avoid the bird. This incident generated a rich dis-
cussion about whether an AV should always follow the rules
of the road, which could mean killing the occasional bird, or
if they should be more careful. To our surprise, the experi-
ence generated an important discussion about the gap between
hype and reality. It also revealed a paradox of acceptance: if
the technology works, its users may be briefly impressed but
quickly bored. The technology’s opacity (we cannot see how
orwhy it is doing what it is doing) make it oddly unimpressive.
Its possible benefits (safety and efficiency) are almost always
invisible. Also, any reductions in cost are only likely to come
at scale rather than upfront. The acceptance frame asks peo-
ple to be awed by the novelty of a technology while being also
convinced of its equivalence with technologies they know.
All Sciencewise dialogues are evaluated by independent
contractors. At their best, these evaluations go beyond ques-
tions of process and compliance with the Sciencewise guiding
principles to ask what the dialogue achieved. This is a vexed
issue because dialogues take place within the complex and
fast-moving world of policy and because policymakers are
reluctant to give credit to citizens for policies that they take
forward. The evaluation report notes that the project was
timely and well-placed to influence policy.13 Wewere told that
our report14 was widely read within government, and we have
been invited to present the work within DfT twice. One of the
senior officials who commissioned the work described in an
interview its value in giving policymakers:
a broader view about the importance of speaking to mem-
bers of the public than just building acceptability of tech-
nology… what they probably got was a bit more of a
vocabulary that they could use and a bit more of an
evidence base they could use to help explain why that might
be a useful and beneficial thing to do.
This official saw their role in making the case for, as well
as learning from, public dialogue:
I’ve promoted it to various colleagues who work in similar
teams around the world and they’re really excited about
the fact that this sort of work is going on… It still feels like
the start of things and it still feels a little bit like walking
into headwinds but I think it’s been relatively successful so
far.
They went on to describe the value of dialogue in commu-
nicating with politicians:
Ministers… generally spend quite a lot of their time engag-
ing with members of the public for one reason or another,
and take their representative role quite seriously. And if
you present them with something which allows them to do
that in a methodical way… they’ll be pretty receptive to
it… One thing it does do is it gives you an opportunity to
actually present that to aMinister and to engage aMinister.
Their conclusion was that the public dialogue, as with
other forms of policy input, would have more impact ‘if
the stars align’, that is, if its insights fit rather than clash
with existing political priorities. The Sciencewise CAV dia-
logue was constrained by its policy connections, but these
connections also allowed it to help advance some new pol-
icy possibilities, while challenging the views some of the more
naïve views of public engagement that had been allowed to
circulate. Our second dialogue was rather different.
2. Citizens’Dialogue on Driverless Mobility
The Citizens’ Dialogue on Driverless Mobility is, at the time
of writing, an ongoing international project involving deliber-
ation events in 17 places across nine countries. The initiative
came from a collaboration between Mahmud Farooque of
Arizona State University and Yves Mathieu, founder of a
French organisation, Missions Publiques. With encourage-
ment from the Kettering Foundation, which supports citizen
participation, the aim was to try public dialogue without a
pre-imposed structure. Farooque’s suggested topic was AVs.
He had previously led two free-form dialogues on the subject
in American cities. He and Mathieu, a long-standing collab-
orator, proposed holding a set of deliberative events on the
same topic, at the same time, in a range of locations in France.
The idea of simultaneous deliberation had been part of the
World-Wide Views initiative and had generated media interest
in the process and its outcomes.
The project was motivated by a desire to get past super-
ficial discussions that had, up to that point, been dominated
by industry representatives who stood to benefit from keep-
ing the topic narrow and protecting some of the hype from
critical assessment. The project’s leaders also envisaged that
dialogue, even if it asked critical questions, could contribute
to the building of trust among stakeholders, citizens, and pol-
icymakers. The desire to increase reach and relevance meant
placing limits on its free-form design. The project leaders
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world and they attracted supporters with a range of stand-
points. Some, including PAVE, were strongly committed to
the development and use of AVs, but they were part of a
broad group that included proponents of citizen participation,
local authorities, and other organisations without a defined
position.
We were approached in 2018 by Involve, ‘the UK’s pub-
lic participation charity’, which had itself been approached
by Missions Publiques to run the UK arm of the global dia-
logue. We wanted to centre the dialogue on a particular place
so that we could meaningfully bring local issues and pol-
icy agendas into the discussion. Of the city authorities we
approached, TfGM was interested and able to fund such
an initiative through a European Union project. Even with
TfGM’s enthusiasm, it took a year to agree and plan a 1-day
dialogue event. The ‘Citizens’ Conversation’ took place in
October 2019, involving 50 residents of Greater Manchester,
recruited via mass mailout, and selected to ensure a diverse
sample. The event was led by Involve, with TfGM staff, after
a short training session, facilitating small group discussions.
We both acted as expert resources, giving short talks during
the day, observing discussions, and standing by to answer
questions.
The day followed the same structure as events taking
place in other cities, moving through five sessions, and using
standardised presentation videos and discussion materials:
(1) Your transportation routine today and how driverless
vehicles might affect it.
(2) Trust and confidence in automated systems.
(3) Future automated transportation scenarios.
(4) Who is in charge?
(5) What are the priorities for your area?
The content of the first four sessions had been agreed by a
steering group, of which one of us was a member, to enable
comparison across all of the participating cities. The fifth ses-
sion was aimed at, and framed by, TfGM. TfGM staff used
this session to test participants’ views on a set of five AV use
cases.
The Manchester Citizens’ Conversation has been sum-
marised in a report published by Involve.15 Our own interview
with a TfGM policy lead suggested that the day had been use-
ful, but the timing was not ideal. By the time the Citizens’
Conversation took place, TfGM had already established a
set of policy principles, including, for example, an insistence
that AVs must improve safety for all road users and com-
plement conventional public transport. There was therefore
no expectation that the Conversation could shape TfGM’s
policy on AVs. Instead, it merely ‘developed and refined’
the organisation’s principles. TfGM had developed a set of
‘personas’—descriptions of potential users of AV technology.
Our interviewee was pleased that ‘Most of [the participants]
fitted within the six personas…but there were also some
anomalies… So we can identify the gaps that we have in this
process.’ In this case, the exercise served to largely confirm the
organisation’s view of the public.
This process fell short of some ideals of deliberative democ-
racy for two reasons. First, the requirement for all cities to
follow the same structure limited Manchester’s capacity to
design an event tailored to its context. Second, poor timing
meant the event missed a window of opportunity to contribute
to local policy on CAVs. The strength of the model, an off-
the-peg deliberative exercise, was also its main weakness. The
irony was that the lack of a strong top-down policy framing
led to an emphasis on standardisation, which restricted the
exercise’s responsiveness.
2.1 Conclusion: public dialogue as social learning
These two public dialogue exercises took place against the
backdrop of a narrative that diagnosed public acceptance as
a major problem for future self-driving vehicles. This fram-
ing of the public and their potential engagement was also a
framing of the state of the technology and its possible future
trajectories. Our normative and analytical position was that
this frame needed to be challenged and we wanted to see
if, through public dialogue, we could test and then shift
assumptions held by others about both the public and the
technology.
Our experience of two dialogues, one with a policy agenda
in search of a public and one with a process in search of a pol-
icy agenda, revealed the potential and limits of dialogue as a
frame-breaking exercise. The Sciencewise dialogue was driven
by a mix of motivations: some instrumental and some critical.
It was pulled between twin desires to test future users’ accep-
tance and to unearth a broader range of public issues. The
Missions Publiques initiative had an ideal of participation,
but its efforts to ensure relevance and standardisation meant
inevitable compromises that had the effect of narrowing par-
ticipation and fixing a particular image of the technology.
Although one was ostensibly top-down and the other osten-
sibly bottom-up, both raised a serious question for upstream
public engagement: does organised public dialogue necessar-
ily reify the technologies under discussion? Do attempts to
break the frame of public acceptance end up reinforcing it?
We recognise the risk, but would conclude that public dia-
logue can, if done with care, disrupt the definition of issues
as part of a process of social learning. The ‘success’ of public
dialogue depends to a large degree on policymakers putting
their own assumptions at risk and trusting in citizens’ abil-
ity to contribute new framings. Public dialogue can be a safe
space in which to realise the possibility of surprise.
Comparing the two dialogues tells us something about
the processes that seem to enable open participation. The
length of the Sciencewise dialogue allowed the discussion to
be deep, and to cover many issues, but also allowed the
participants to feel empowered. Participants were, on the
whole, able to frame their own questions to experts rather
than feel cowed by their expertise. The Missions Publiques
exercise in Manchester was shorter and the expert resources
more limited, but the participants still felt empowered. How-
ever, the most important lessons are not about dialogue
processes. Indeed, in many discussions of institutionalised
public dialogue, questions of how it should take place some-
times obscure more important conversations about why it
should take place (Stilgoe et al. 2014). Both of our dialogue
exercises were products of compromises between multiple
parties, whose motivations were sometimes conflicted. As
facilitators, we saw part of our job as navigating and some-
times resolving these institutional constraints and tensions.
The seemingly simple act of asking people to engage in a con-
versation becomes radical once we consider the institutional
assumptions that offer resistance to genuine dialogue. Ensur-
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(Stirling et al. 2012) represents an ongoing challenge that
requires constant attention. In our case, there was a need
to resist and seek to correct naïve assumptions about AV
technologies and imagined public attitudes towards them.
The first challenge to the mental model of ‘awareness,
acceptance and adoption’ is an empirical one. As would be
predicted by critiques of the deficit model of public under-
standing, greater awareness of the technology does not seem
to be leading to greater acceptance.16 But the more profound
critique is that innovators cannot ask people to accept a tech-
nology that does not yet exist. Innovators’ and policymakers’
concern with public acceptance of self-driving vehicles reflects
a view not just of public deficits, but also of technological
certainty and the appropriate governance of technology. This
discourse separates the means and ends of technology, post-
poning the question of what the technology is for. This tech-
nological determinism casts policymakers as mere enablers for
the technology and social scientists as advisers to this process.
Our experience of having been involved in arguing for, setting
up, and running experiments in public dialogue has revealed
the potential for and the constraints on rethinking policymak-
ers’ agency in a process of social learning. The paradox is
that the real value of dialogue seems to come once policy-
makers relax their assumptions about what it can achieve.
Public dialogue asks for open-mindedness (or, more formally,
institutional reflexivity (Wynne 1993)), but it can also encour-
age open-mindedness, destabilising views of the public and of
technology that have been allowed to ossify.
We are under no illusion that our reasons for doing public
dialogue may not be shared by all the other parties involved.
There is a clear need for clarity on the motivations of public
engagement (Weingart and Joubert 2019; Stilgoe et al. 2014).
However, there is a pragmatic case for clarity of purpose to be
an emergent outcome of rather than a precursor to the pro-
cess of deliberation. We recognise that some of the relevant
policymakers surrounding our dialogue processes had instru-
mental motivations for engagement. Others, however, were
more open-minded. We wanted to explore the potential for
dialogue as what Andy Stirling (2011) calls ‘political judo’,
using others’ power as a way to move them to a new place.
In framing public dialogue, policymakers are at least asked to
articulate why they are doing what they are doing, which can
bring assumptions and contradictions to the surface.
In discussions with the civil servants overseeing the Sci-
encewise process, we offered reminders that the technology
did not yet exist and was not inevitable and that talk of pub-
lic acceptance was, if nothing else, premature. The move
from talking about the social acceptance of technologies to
talking about ‘acceptability’, while it might seem subtle in pol-
icy terms, is therefore important (Fournis and Fortin 2017)
even if it represents an incomplete shift in framing (Marris
and Calvert 2020). With emerging technologies whose social
constitutions are still up in the air and whose benefits are
unproven, we could perhaps make the point more clearly by
asking whether technological systems are willing to accept
public values. For AVs, this means imagining public concerns
beyond those of safety, including questions of accessibility,
fairness, and privacy, all of which emerged from our dia-
logues. For public dialogue, this means providing space for
the consideration of emergent concerns. Dialogue processes
should give participants the time and resources to deliberately
challenge dominant views of the technology. Rather than
thinking about public dialogue as a one–off exercise, we
could better reimagine governance as taking place ‘in dia-
logue’, demanding ongoing conversation with the general
public and particular public groups. Governance would also
benefit from disciplinary diversity. As described above, the
use of social science in debates about self-driving vehicles is
currently instrumental and tilted towards psychology. The
case for more diverse, more critical perspectives seems clear
(Cohen et al. 2020).
If we see public dialogue as part of a ‘higher-order game’
(Irwin et al. 2013) involving the politics of technological
progress, we can see ‘acceptance’ talk in a new light. Rather
than being asked to place their trust in a technology, the
public are being asked to place their trust in technologists.
Their imagined role is first as compliant consumers, helping
to ensure the technology’s success, and second as supportive
citizens while the technology is being tested in plain sight.
This speaks to two prominent AV policy agendas—support
for innovation and enabling of testing—but not to a third,
which we would argue is just as important but is often post-
poned: the question of what place AVs could have in future
mobility.
Our dialogues played out during a period when the early
hype surrounding self-driving vehicles was subsiding. As
research in science and technology studies would predict, this
has led to an increase rather a decrease in social uncertainty
(Borup et al. 2006). The more society learns about a technol-
ogy, the clearer its uncertainties become: the hype is tested by
its encounter with reality. Public dialogue can be an important
part of how policymakers make sense of new technologies,
while challenging their own views of who the public are and
what they think.
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Notes
1. The original frame-breakers were of course the Luddites. ‘Lud-
dite’ has become a pejorative term for people perceived as anti-
technology, but the Luddite cause was actually, as Hobsbawm
(1952) shows, about the rights of workers to defend themselves
against exploitation by capitalists.
2. https://medium.com/pave-campaign/about, accessed 10 March
2021.
3. Quotes taken from a talk at the Automated Vehicles Symposium,
Orlando, 2019.
4. Zenzic Roadmap, https://zenzic.io/roadmap/, accessed 5
November 2020.
5. John Krafcik at the Lisbon Web Summit, 2017.
6. A key source of this statistic notes the complexity of separating
out causes of crashes. Crashes are products of multiple causes,
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the blame far more often than the environment or mechani-
cal failure. Each crash is ascribed a ‘critical reason’, but, as
the report clarifies, the ‘critical reason… is not intended to be
interpreted as the cause of the crash.’ (NHTSA 2015) https://
crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812115.
7. The narrative of AV acceptance has a longer history. In an early
paper on ‘Computer-controlled cars’ JohnMacarthy argued, under
the heading ‘Public acceptance’, ‘Automobiles without qualified
human drivers will require changes in the law. Fortunately, test-
ing such systems with a driver present to take over if necessary
does not. Moreover, computer driven cars will not be able to obey
oral instructions from policemen, so a digital system will have to be
developed. A general resistance to technological innovation on the
part of the literary culture will have to be overcome, but it seems
to me that after the test phase the advantages will be clear enough
so that this will not be difficult.’ A version of this paper is available
at http://jmc.stanford.edu/commentary/progress/cars.pdf, accessed
10 March 2021.
8. The Government’s Approach to Public Dialogue on Science and
Technology, http://sciencewise.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/
11/Guiding-Principles.pdf.
9. The project was commissioned with the word ‘autonomous’ in its
title but the final report replaced this with ‘automated’.
10. The CCAV is a joint venture between the UK’s Department for
Transport and its Department for Business, Energy and Indus-
trial Strategy. CCAV aims to ‘make everyday journeys greener,
safer, more flexible and more reliable by shaping the safe and
secure emergence of connected and self-driving vehicles in the
UK [by] investing in innovation and skills and engaging the
public to realise the benefits of new transport technologies and
to create a thriving connected and self-driving vehicle sector in
the UK.’ https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/centre-for-
connected-and-autonomous-vehicles/about, accessed 10 March
2021.
11. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/driverless-vehicles-
connected-and-autonomous-technologies, accessed 10 February
2021.
12. Readers should bear in mind that policymakers who talk to us
know we are enthusiasts for and participants in public dialogue, so
respondents’ views may be coloured by enthusiasm and politeness.





14. CAV public acceptability dialogue engagement report, https://
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/951094/cav-public-acceptability-
dialogue-engagement.pdf, accessed 10 February 2021.
15. What could the future of driverless vehicles look like in Greater
Manchester? Involve, https://www.involve.org.uk/our-work/our-
projects/practice/what-could-future-driverless-vehicles-look-
greater-manchester, accessed 12 February 2021. At the time of
writing, there is no published meta-analysis of all of the dialogues,
but more information is available at https://themobilitydebate.net/,
accessed 16 July 2021.
16. See, for example, a small survey reported with the headline
‘Autonomous Vehicle Awareness Rising, Acceptance Declining,
According to Cox Automotive Mobility Study’ https://www.
prnewswire.com/news-releases/autonomous-vehicle-awareness-
rising-acceptance-declining-according-to-cox-automotive-mobi
lity-study-300697862.html, accessed 15 February 2021.
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